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In Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, the Supreme Court held that RICO’s civil cause of action—permitting recovery for those “injured in his business or property” under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)—does not categorically bar claims for business or property losses simply because they derive from a personal injury. This is an important ruling for civil litigation under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Barrett resolved a circuit split in favor of giving RICO a broad remedial reach. But her opinion, which drew strong dissents, leaves significant questions unanswered and foreshadows future litigation.

The case centers on Douglas Horn, a commercial truck driver who, after a 2012 crash left him with chronic pain, sought relief through “Dixie X,” a CBD tincture marketed by Medical Marijuana, Inc. as containing 0% THC—the psychoactive compound in cannabis that could jeopardize his job if detected in a drug test. Assured by the company’s advertising and customer service, Horn used the product, only to fail a subsequent drug test due to trace THC levels. His refusal to enter a substance-abuse program led to his termination. Horn sued Medical Marijuana under RICO, alleging that the company’s false advertising (via mail and wire fraud) constituted a pattern of racketeering activity, causing him to lose his job—a business injury.

The district court dismissed Horn’s RICO claim, reasoning that his job loss flowed from a personal injury (ingesting THC) and thus fell outside the scope of § 1964(c), which excludes personal injuries. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that RICO imposes no “antecedent-personal-injury bar” and that business or property injuries can be actionable even if they stem from personal injuries. This stance deepened a circuit split: the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits had previously barred such derivative claims, while the Ninth Circuit had come to the same conclusion as the Second. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this divide.

Joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, Justice Barrett conducted a textual analysis of § 1964(c)’s phrase “injured in his business or property.” The Court defined “injured” in accordance with its ordinary meaning—“to cause harm or damage”—drawing from dictionaries contemporaneous with the law’s passage, such as Webster’s Third (1971) and Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (1969). Under this definition, a plaintiff is injured in their business or property if a business or property interest is harmed, irrespective of whether the harm traces back to a personal injury.

The Court acknowledged that § 1964(c) implicitly excludes recovery for personal injuries themselves (e.g., pain and suffering), a point settled in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community (2016). However, it rejected the notion that this exclusion extends to business or property losses resulting from personal injuries. For instance, a gas station owner beaten in a robbery cannot recover for bodily harm under RICO, but if forced to close his business due to the injuries, he can seek damages for that business loss.

Medical Marijuana argued that “injured” is a tort-law term of art, meaning the invasion of a legal right (e.g., a business or property tort), and that personal injuries, therefore, cannot trigger RICO claims, even if they have economic consequences. The Court dismissed this argument, finding no textual or contextual support for importing a tort-centric limitation. It distinguished RICO from the Clayton Act—its statutory model—noting that RICO lacks antitrust law’s additional requirement of a specific “antitrust injury,” as clarified in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. (1985).

The majority also addressed practical concerns, arguing that other RICO elements—like the need to prove a “pattern of racketeering activity” and a “direct relationship” between the violation and injury—prevent an influx of frivolous claims. Horn’s case, the Court noted, may falter on causation grounds, given the multiple steps between the misrepresentation and his job loss.

Notably, the Court sidestepped ancillary issues: whether Horn suffered a personal injury (assumed for argument’s sake), whether “business” includes employment (unchallenged here), and what constitutes “property” injury (irrelevant since Horn claimed a business injury). The Court focused on whether there is a blanket bar on derivative economic losses and rejected the notion.

The decision drew sharp dissents, reflecting unease with its scope and methodology.

Justice Thomas said the Court should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted, arguing it was a poor vehicle for resolving the circuit split. He pointed out that a threshold dispute—whether Horn’s THC ingestion was, in fact, a personal injury (Horn denied it, Medical Marijuana flip-flopped)—was left unresolved by the Second Circuit. Thomas also criticized the inadequate briefing on the meaning of “injured in his business or property,” suggesting the Court’s narrow ruling avoided the core question: Are economic losses like lost wages business injuries or personal-injury damages?

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, dissented on substantive grounds, arguing that “injured” is a tort-law term of art meaning the invasion of a legal right. Under this view, RICO excludes personal-injury suits entirely, even if a personal injury results in business or property losses (e.g., lost wages). Kavanaugh invoked antitrust precedent (e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 1922) and the federalism canon, warning that the majority’s ruling risks federalizing state tort law. He criticized the Court for adopting an ordinary-meaning approach, predicting confusion over whether losses like wages or medical expenses qualify as RICO injuries.

This ruling clarifies that RICO’s civil remedy extends to business or property losses even if they arise from personal injuries, aligning with the Second and Ninth Circuits and rejecting the approach adopted by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh. Yet its limited scope—defining “injured” without addressing the definitions of “business” or “property”—leaves practitioners with uncertainty. Can lost wages from a personal injury sustain a RICO claim? Furthermore, can an injured party sue for medical expenses under RICO? The majority’s silence on these related issues invites litigation to test these boundaries.

For now, Horn’s case has been remanded for causation analysis: he must prove that Medical Marijuana’s misrepresentations directly caused his firing—no small feat. As lower courts grapple with the questions left open by this decision, the legal community should watch for clarification on the definitions of “business” (does it include everything related to employment?) and “property” (are pecuniary losses always sufficient?). Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn opens a door—but not a floodgate—to creative RICO pleading, balanced by the statute’s inherent constraints.