In a November en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed decades of jurisprudence and rewrote its approach to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in the context of redistricting.

Petteway v. Galveston County centered on whether a pair of racial minority groups can combine to challenge a redistricting plan under the results prong of the Voting Rights Act. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court required that when a minority group seeks to bring a challenge to a districting plan, that minority group must comprise a majority in a proposed reasonably configured legislative district. The Fifth Circuit, along with a number of other circuits, had allowed racial minority groups to combine to cross the numeric fifty percent threshold in an illustrative district to satisfy the first Gingles precondition—ever since its 1988 decision in Campos v. City of Baytown. In Petteway, the Fifth Circuit overruled Campos and held that the Voting Rights Act and Gingles require a single racial minority group to comprise more than fifty percent of a proposed district to satisfy the first Gingles precondition. Thus, plaintiffs in Petteway could not bring a Voting Rights Act challenge because neither the Hispanic nor the Black population could constitute fifty percent in any proposed district, independent of each other. In the district dismantled by a new legislative map, neither Blacks nor Hispanics had any ability to draw a district where one of them could comprise over fifty percent of the population.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: A Brief Overview

Enacted in 1965, the Voting Rights Act was fundamentally transformational civil rights legislation aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in voting. It reorganized American politics at every level of government. Section 2 of the VRA was amended in 1982. The 1982 amendments added a “results” prong to the law that prohibits any voting practice or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race.

In Gingles, the Court established numerous elements a plaintiff must prove to prevail on this then-new results claim. The first element is that an illustrative alternative district must actually have a racial minority in majority status. If a plaintiff cannot establish that the minority group could constitute a majority, defendants are entitled to summary judgment in a Section 2 case. Plaintiffs carry other burdens, including the three Gingles preconditions. These preconditions require plaintiffs to show that: (1) the minority group is large and geographically compact enough to form a majority in a possible district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Only the first Gingles precondition was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Petteway.

Coalition claims—claims that combine various minority groups to meet VRA requirements—have become more important in recent redistricting challenges as America’s demographic landscape has changed and minority groups have combined to challenge and create legislative districts across the country under the threat of a Voting Rights Act challenge.

The Campos Precedent: A Foundation for Coalition Claims

The issue at the heart of Petteway was whether Campos v. City of Baytown should be reversed. In Campos, the court allowed a coalition of Black and Hispanic voters to challenge a redistricting plan under Section 2, even though neither group could individually create a majority-minority district on their own. Under Campos, courts could aggregate distinct minority populations when assessing whether a voting district had been drawn in a way that diluted the voting power of a coalition of minority groups.

Over the years, Campos had been cited in several cases where minority coalitions argued that they were entitled to a combined coalition district. In Petteway, the Fifth Circuit took a fresh look at this precedent and concluded that Campos did not align with the explicit and unambiguous text of Section 2 or the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VRA.

The Petteway Case: A New Chapter in Voting Rights Jurisprudence

The plaintiffs in Petteway v. Galveston County challenged a 2021 redistricting plan adopted by Galveston County, Texas, arguing that it diluted the votes of Black and Hispanic voters by dismantling the county’s only majority-minority district, Precinct 3. After receiving the 2020 census data, the Galveston County Commissioners Court adopted a new map that eliminated Precinct 3 in favor of a new plan with no majority-minority district and a unified coastal district instead. Galveston has a history that implicates coastal issues in a way not many other jurisdictions do. The original district had a combined population of Black and Hispanic voters that comprised fifty-eight percent of the precinct’s citizen voting-age population. Despite having a significant presence, the Black and Hispanic populations were geographically concentrated in different parts of the county, and the plaintiffs argued that the new plan diluted their voting power by splitting up these populations.

The district court sided with the plaintiffs, ruling that the redistricting plan violated Section 2 because it diluted the voting power of the Black and Hispanic coalition. The court relied on Campos, holding that distinct minority groups could aggregate their populations when claiming vote dilution under Section 2.

The en banc Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, overruled Campos, and established a new basis for evaluating Section 2 claims. The court held that coalition claims are not permitted under Section 2, and that instead each minority group must independently meet the Gingles preconditions in order to bring a valid claim.

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion was grounded in a close reading of the statutory language of Section 2, the legislative history, and Supreme Court precedent interpreting the VRA, particularly Bartlett v. Strickland. The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that coalition claims, as allowed under Campos, did not align with the statutory text or legislative history and were inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s previous interpretations of similar issues.

In its textual analysis, the Fifth Circuit focused on the critical distinction between the use of the singular form of “class” versus the plural form. Section 2 consistently refers to “a class” in the singular, indicating that the claim must be based on a single protected group, defined by shared characteristics like race, color, or language minority status. The statute’s language and legal precedents emphasize that “a class” refers to a group with a common, defining characteristic and is not intended to encompass multiple distinct groups. Legal arguments attempting to expand this to include coalitions of minority groups do not align with the statutory language or legislative history. Courts have consistently interpreted the term “protected class” to mean a singular group, rejecting any inference that minority coalitions are covered under Section 2. Thus, the analysis of vote dilution claims must focus on individual classes rather than aggregated or combined groups.

In the dissenting opinion, Judges Haynes, Douglas, Steward, Graves, Higginson, and Ramirez disagreed with the majority’s singular interpretation of Section 2, arguing that the plural approach was more consistent with the statute’s purpose of protecting minority voting power. The dissenters believed that coalition claims should be allowed. They contended that limiting Section 2 to singular groups would disenfranchise communities where minority populations are geographically dispersed. In his concurring opinion, Judge Ho agreed with the majority’s decision but wrote separately to further clarify the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bartlett v. Strickland.

Key Takeaways and Broader Implications

The Petteway decision marks an important change in the jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit and potentially beyond. There were already a variety of approaches in the circuits. The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, has held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not authorize minority coalition claims, emphasizing the absence of textual support for combining distinct minority groups. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged the possibility of coalition claims if the groups demonstrate political cohesion. Other circuits, such as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth, have addressed coalition claims without explicitly deciding their permissibility, deciding them on other grounds.

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