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On May 15, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. CASA, Inc., a case that could reshape how federal courts approach injunctions that extend beyond the litigants before them. The matter arose from Executive Order 14,160, issued by President Donald Trump on his first day back in office. The order asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not automatically confer U.S. citizenship on children born to illegal aliens or temporary visa holders.

The order was met with swift and widespread litigation. District courts responded with a series of injunctions that blocked its enforcement nationwide. These “universal” or “nationwide” injunctions have been the subject of increasing legal debate, and this case provided the Court with an opportunity to directly confront their validity.

John Sauer’s Argument Against Universal Injunctions

Representing the federal government, Solicitor General John Sauer advanced a historically grounded argument against universal injunctions. His position rested on two complementary claims: first, that Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power to redressing specific injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in a given case, and second, that traditional equitable doctrines—especially as codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789—never contemplated remedies extending to nonparties.

Sauer traced the rise of universal injunctions to the 1963 case, Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., and suggested that the judges ordering these remedies have increasingly departed from the Founders’ conception of judicial authority. He portrayed these injunctions as both doctrinally unsound and disruptive to the functioning of the federal judiciary. He emphasized that they encourage forum shopping, preempt appellate percolation, and place extraordinary burdens on courts to issue sweeping, often rushed, decisions in complex constitutional cases.

Perhaps most compelling was Sauer’s argument that the structure of Article III imposes a natural limitation on judicial reach: courts exist to resolve disputes between parties, not to issue abstract declarations with universal force. As he put it, the remedy should follow the injury, and unless a broader group has been certified as a class under Rule 23, the reach of an injunction should be no greater than the scope of the plaintiffs’ standing.

In addition to the constitutional frame, Sauer reminded the Court that equitable relief has always been tightly linked to the parties before the court. Citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., he warned that expanding injunctive powers without historical support risks overstepping judicial boundaries. He referenced Chief Judge Sutton’s comparison of modern universal injunctions to a “dragon” that overwhelms the more “domesticated” remedies of earlier eras.

The Citizenship Clause: Substance and Precedent

While the Court has not yet been asked to decide the constitutionality of Executive Order 14,160, the merits question loomed large throughout the argument. Several Justices, led by Justice Sotomayor, raised the issue directly, pointing to United States v. Wong Kim Ark, which affirmed birthright citizenship for children born on U.S. soil to lawful residents who were not U.S. citizens.

Justice Sotomayor appeared skeptical that the executive branch could reinterpret the Citizenship Clause through unilateral action. She asked whether limiting judicial remedies to named plaintiffs, as Sauer urged, would functionally allow an unconstitutional executive policy to persist for years while affected individuals had to bring suit one by one. Justice Kagan echoed these concerns, suggesting that unless courts can issue broader injunctions, there might be no practical check on sweeping executive overreach.

Sauer acknowledged that class certification under Rule 23 could serve as a lawful mechanism to achieve broader relief, provided plaintiffs could meet the rigorous criteria. He also emphasized that the Supreme Court can issue decisions that constitute binding precedent, thereby creating national uniformity without the need for universal injunctions in lower courts.

The Respondents’ View: Defense of Injunctive Breadth

New Jersey Solicitor General Jeremy Feigenbaum appeared on behalf of the state and city respondents. He defended the necessity of broad relief in a case involving federal policy that, in the view of his clients, immediately and adversely affected thousands of people. He explained that federal law requires states to verify citizenship when administering benefits such as SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid. He argued that if an individual is not given citizenship at birth, it will make it harder to receive a Social Security number, a necessity to collect these benefits. Feigenbaum then said that this would burden the states by forcing the states to delay administering the benefits or to administer them on a provisional basis.

Feigenbaum described three “buckets” for when universal relief is appropriate. First, when there is no alternative way of remedying the harm and a broad injunction is needed—this is the bucket that he says the states fall into in this case. Second, when there is congressional delegation to issue broad injunctions such as under the Administrative Procedure Act. Third, when alternatives, such as class certification, are not viable for urgent cases. Justice Gorsuch pushed back against the idea of the third bucket and said that it seems to always result in a reversion back to the first bucket. 

Kelsi Corkran, arguing for the private respondents, maintained a similar focus and expanded upon Feigenbaum’s three buckets. Her advocacy highlighted the individual harm experienced by children who, under the executive order, would be denied American citizenship despite being born on U.S. soil. Corkran argued that her clients fall within the first bucket and require a universal injunction that covers more than just the named plaintiffs, because many of her clients are using pseudonyms out of fear of deportation. She insisted that without a universal injunction, her clients would have to reveal their actual names to the government and thus risk removal. She defended the third bucket by saying that class certification can be very discovery-intensive, which would be inadequate to get her clients the relief they need in a timely manner.

The Justices’ Balancing Act

The oral argument reflected the Court’s ongoing attempt to navigate between legal formalism and judicial pragmatism. Justice Thomas, long critical of universal injunctions, invited all counsel to elaborate on the historical pedigree—or lack thereof—of such remedies. Justice Gorsuch appeared sympathetic to concerns about institutional overreach, but he also pressed Sauer on whether alternative mechanisms were realistic in emergencies.

Justice Barrett raised complex questions about who can enforce broad injunctions and what it means to be “bound” by a judgment. Justice Jackson engaged deeply with the distinction between divisible and indivisible remedies, suggesting that the Constitution may not require such rigid distinctions as Sauer proposed.

The Chief Justice may have offered a procedural compromise. Noting the urgency of the legal question, he pointed out that the Court has handled complex issues on an expedited timeline before—citing the TikTok litigation—and that the Court could resolve the merits question of the case swiftly in order to mitigate the need for broad interim relief by lower courts.

Looking Ahead

Whatever the Court decides, Trump v. CASA, Inc. is poised to leave a lasting mark on constitutional litigation. If the Court narrows the availability of universal injunctions, plaintiffs challenging federal policies may need to rely more heavily on class actions or await appellate resolution, shifting the tactical landscape for constitutional and administrative challenges alike. On the other hand, if the Court affirms the lower courts’ authority to issue nationwide relief, it may cement a tool that critics argue expands judicial power beyond its constitutional limits.

Whether one agrees with Sauer’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment or not, his warning against remedying systemic issues with tools that exceed traditional judicial bounds raises important questions about the limits of judicial authority.

The Court’s decision is expected by the end of the Term and will almost certainly clarify how nationwide relief is conceived, justified, and administered in the federal courts. If the government loses, Executive Order 14,160 will remain enjoined while the merits of the case percolate through the lower courts, and district courts will retain the ability to issue injunctions that bind the entire federal government nationwide. But if the government wins, there is likely to be a narrowing of the ability of district courts to issue nationwide injunctions.