The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dunlap arose from a routine traffic stop that uncovered an illegal firearm.[1] The case raised questions about the permissible scope of police authority during traffic stops. Specifically, the case examined whether an officer’s reasonable suspicion—initially justified by information that the vehicle's registered owner had a suspended license—ceases once the officer observes that the driver does not match the owner’s description. In Dunlap, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the police could continue to inquire into the driver’s ability to legally drive the vehicle. 

Background: What happened in State v. Dunlap?

Officer Andrew Centrackio stopped a vehicle after running its license plate through the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS), which revealed the registered owner, Jessica Dunlap, had a suspended driver’s license.[2] But upon approaching the car, Officer Centrackio saw that the driver was not Dunlap, who was a passenger in the vehicle, but instead was Je’Brel Lewis.[3] Nevertheless, Officer Centrackio asked Lewis for his driver’s license.[4] Instead, Lewis showed his state-issued identification card.[5] After running the information in LEADS, Officer Centrackio learned that Lewis also had a suspended license.[6] Because neither Lewis nor Dunlap had a valid driver’s license, Centrackio called for a tow truck and prepared to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle.[7]

Officer Centrackio had also learned from LEADS that Lewis had active arrest warrants and that some of his prior charges included improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle.[8] So he asked Lewis whether there were any weapons in the vehicle.[9] Lewis stated that there was an unloaded firearm located in the front passenger-side door and gave the officer permission to search the car.[10] The search revealed the firearm in the front passenger-side door and a loaded magazine on the floor of the back seat.[11]

Dunlap and Lewis were each indicted on one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle.[12] They both filed motions to suppress the evidence discovered in the car, arguing that it was unlawful for the officer to prolong the stop after he realized that Dunlap was not driving.[13]

The trial court denied the motions to suppress, concluding that the officer’s actions were lawful.[14] However, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, by continuing the stop after realizing Dunlap was not the driver, Officer Centrackio had violated the Fourth Amendment. In a 5-2 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the convictions. A divided bench offered varying justifications for the decision, with no opinion garnering the votes of a majority of justices.

The Lead Opinion

Justice Patrick DeWine, writing for a three-justice plurality, found that Officer Centrackio’s actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The plurality’s decision rested on two key points: (1) the initial stop was lawful; and (2) ordinary inquiries during a lawful traffic stop—such as asking for a valid driver’s license—do not violate the Fourth Amendment. [15]

First, the plurality found that Officer Centrackio had lawfully stopped Dunlap’s vehicle because LEADS revealed information that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dunlap was driving the car without a valid driver’s license.[16] The U.S.  Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop should be evaluated in a manner more like a brief Terry stop than to a formal arrest.[17] An officer initiating a traffic stop must have reasonable suspicion—or, in other words, a “‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’”—for the stop to be valid, but he need not show the probable cause that would be required for an arrest.[18]

Here, the plurality concluded that Officer Centrackio had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. It emphasized that in Kansas v. Glover, the U.S. Supreme Court held that police may initiate a stop if a registered vehicle owner has a revoked license, provided there is no evidence to contradict the reasonable assumption that the owner is the one driving.[19] Leaning on Glover, the plurality held that Officer Centrackio had suspected—based on the LEADS information—that Dunlap was driving without a valid driver’s license, and that that provided reasonable justification for the initial stop.[20] By the time Officer Centrackio reached the car door, any suspicion that Dunlap was driving had dissipated, given that Lewis looked nothing like her. Yet five justices held that it was reasonable for Officer Centrackio to extend the traffic stop to check Lewis’ driver’s status, even in the absence of continued reasonable suspicion that Dunlap was driving without a license.

Why? According to the plurality, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Rodriguez v. United States that checking the driver’s license is an “ordinary inquiry” incident to a traffic stop.[21] After all, checking that a driver has a valid driver’s license serves the same objective as the initial traffic stop: enforcing traffic laws and promoting public safety.[22] Even though the Officer Centrackio’s initial suspicion dissipated upon seeing that Dunlap was not driving, the court held that confirming Lewis’s license status was within the permissible scope of the stop.[23]

Concurring Opinions: Narrower Justifications

Other justices, while agreeing that the court of appeals’ decision should be reversed, would have ruled on much narrower grounds. Justice Michael P. Donnelly, who concurred in the judgment only, agreed with the plurality that Officer Centrackio did not violate Lewis’s or Dunlap’s Fourth Amendment rights because the initial stop was valid. But rather than apply the plurality’s blanket approach, Justice Donnelly’s concurrence argued that the court should impose additional requirements before a police officer may extend a traffic stop to check a driver’s license without violating the Fourth Amendment.[24] He would require some degree of inadvertence or late discovery, reasoning that

"the matter should be resolved by holding that when a police officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and that suspicion is not dispelled until the officer is standing next to the driver’s window, the officer may briefly interact with the driver without violating the Fourth Amendment."[25]

Additionally, Justice Donnelly would hold that if, and only if, during that brief interaction the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the driver does not have a valid license, the officer may extend the stop to check the validity of the driver’s license.

Another member of the court, Justice Melody Stewart, concurred in the judgment only. Justice Stewart criticized the plurality’s reliance on Rodriguez and argued that the court should focus on Ohio precedent permitting minimal intrusions during stops that serve public interests.[26] She analogized the officer’s license inquiry to brief, non-invasive stops upheld in driver’s license checkpoint cases, such as State v. Orr.[27] Justice Stewart warned against overextending police authority, but she agreed the officer’s actions were justified here.

The Dissent

The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and joined by Justice Jennifer Brunner, argued that the officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment. The dissenting justices argue  that the lead opinion erroneously relies on Rodriguez to justify its holding.[28] They contended that once Officer Centrackio saw that Lewis did not match Dunlap’s description, the reasonable suspicion justifying the stop dissipated, and the continued detention was unconstitutional. Relying on State v. Chatton and Kansas v. Glover, the dissent emphasized that officers must terminate stops when the original justification is resolved.[29]

Tahmineh Dehbozorgi is an attorney at the Institute for Justice

 

[1] State v. Dunlap, No. 2024-Ohio-4821, slip op. at ¶ 2 (2024), available at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2024/2024-Ohio-4821.pdf.

[2] Id. at ¶ 4.

[3] Id. at ¶ 6.

[4] Id. at ¶ 7.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at ¶ 8.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at ¶ 9.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at ¶ 11.

[15] The Ohio Supreme Court did not consider claims under the Ohio state constitution because those arguments were waived.

[16] Id. at ¶ 17.

[17] See Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

[18] Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

[19] Id.

[20] Dunlap, No. 2024-Ohio-4821, slip op. at ¶ 17.

[21] 575 U.S. 348 (2015).

[22] Dunlap, No. 2024-Ohio-4821, slip op. at ¶ 20.

[23] Id. at ¶ 23.

[24] Id. at ¶ 31.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at ¶ 37.

[27] 2001-Ohio-50, at ¶ 10.

[28] Dunlap, No. 2024-Ohio-4821, slip op. at ¶ 60.

[29] Id. at ¶¶ 47-49.

 

 

 

 

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