The Fed Still Can’t Legally Fund the CFPB
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An expanded version of this article can be found at Law & Liberty.
The funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been a source of controversy since its creation by the Dodd-Frank Act. The Supreme Court’s recent decision affirmed the constitutionality of “allowing the Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System.”
The Court’s decision has a fatal problem: while the Dodd-Frank Act funds the CFPB from the Fed’s earnings, today there are no Fed earnings. The Fed is losing money at the rate of more than $1 billion per week and has not had a penny of earnings since September 2022; it has instead accumulated the staggering sum of $172 billion in cash losses.
Section 1017 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides:
—Each year… the Board of Governors shall transfer to the Bureau from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System, the amount determined by the [CFPB] Director to be reasonably necessary . . . . [emphasis added]
The Fed stopped sending distributions of its earnings to the U.S. Treasury in September 2022 because it had no earnings to distribute. It should have stopped sending payments to the CFPB at the same time for the same reason. Sending nonexistent earnings to the CFPB violates the clear language of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Under standard accounting rules, the Fed has negative retained earnings, negative capital, and is technically insolvent. Today, the Fed borrows to cover its own and the CFPB’s expenses, primarily in the form of member bank deposits. Under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, these deposits are unsecured obligations of the 12 individual privately owned Federal Reserve Banks and are not guaranteed by the federal government. The Reserve bank deposits used to fund the CFPB are neither “public money” nor “drawn from the Treasury.”
Under current conditions—conditions that the framers of the Dodd-Frank Act never imagined possible—Fed payments to the CFPB conflict with the clear provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Federal Reserve Act. As long as the Fed continues to suffer operating losses, the CFPB is not being funded with Federal Reserve earnings or “public money drawn from the Treasury.”
Senior Fellow, Mises Institute
Alex J. Pollock is a Senior Fellow with the Mises Institute, providing thought and policy leadership on financial issues and the study of financial systems. His work includes cycles of booms and busts, financial crises with their political responses, housing finance, government-sponsored enterprises, risk and uncertainty, central banking, banking and financial regulation, corporate governance, retirement finance, student loans, and the politics of finance.
He previously served as the Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Financial Research in the U.S. Treasury Department 2019-2021. He was a Distinguished Senior Fellow with the R Street Institute 2015-2019 and 2021, and a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 2004-2015. Among the many aspects of his AEI work, he developed the One Page Mortgage Form to give borrowers in clear form the key information they need in order to know what they are committing themselves to. He was President and CEO of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago from 1991 to 2004. There he invented the Mortgage Partnership Finance program, which successfully created front-end mortgage credit risk sharing beginning in 1997. His decades of banking experience include being a Visiting Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1991.
Pollock was a director of the CME Group 2004-2019 and of Ascendium Education Group 1989-2019. He is a director and past-chairman of the Great Books Foundation and a past president of the International Union for Housing Finance.
He is the co-author of Surprised Again! - The COVID Crisis and the New Market Bubble (2022), and the author of Finance and Philosophy—Why We’re Always Surprised (2018) and Boom and Bust: Financial Cycles and Human Prosperity (2011), as well as numerous articles and Congressional testimony.
Pollock is a graduate of Williams College, the University of Chicago, and Princeton University.
His work is available on alexjpollock.com.
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Paul H. Kupiec is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he studies systemic risk and the management and regulations of banks and financial markets. He also follows the work of financial regulators such as the Federal Reserve and examines the impact of financial regulations on the US economy.
Before joining AEI, Kupiec was an associate director of the Division of Insurance and Research within the Center for Financial Research at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), where he oversaw research on bank risk measurement and the development of regulatory policies such as Basel III. Kupiec was also director of the Center for Financial Research at the FDIC and chairman of the Research Task Force of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. He has previously worked at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Freddie Mac, J.P. Morgan, and for the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kupiec has edited many professional journals, including the Journal of Financial Services Research, Journal of Risk, and Journal of Investment Management.
He has a bachelor of science degree in economics from George Washington University and a doctorate in economics — with a specialization in finance, theory, and econometrics — from the University of Pennsylvania.