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In Bailey v. County of Shelby, No. W2005-01508-SCR11-CV, 2206 Tenn. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. March, 29, 2006), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that term limits contained in county charters are authorized by both the Tennessee Code and by Tennessee’s constitution. In 1986, the voters of Shelby County, Tennessee, voted to adopt a charter form of government. Under state law, a charter county is required to have a legislative body. The plaintiffs were three members of the Shelby County Board of Commissioners who would each complete two consecutive terms as commissioners in 2006. The plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Shelby County charter, which had been adopted by voters in 1994, which imposes a term limit of two consecutive four-year terms upon commissioners. The trial court held that there was no statutory or constitutional bar to term limits. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, found that the statute in question conflicted with Tennessee’s constitution. The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issues in this case on an expedited appeal.

In seeking to avoid imposition of the term limits, the plaintiffs made three arguments. First, the plaintiffs contended that Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-210(4) did not grant a county charter, such as the Shelby County charter, the authority to establish term limits. The statute states that county charters shall provide for the “size, method of election, qualification for holding office, method of removal, and procedures of the county legislative body…” (emphasis added). The plaintiffs claimed that status of prior election to the county commission was not a “qualification for holding office” that could be determined by a county charter. Plaintiffs argued that Article VII of Tennessee’s constitution prohibited term limits as a qualification because Article VII specifically proscribed county commissioners to four-year terms. The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that Article VII only set a duration of four years for a term as commissioner. Article VII was silent as to whether a commissioner could serve multiple terms. Accordingly, the Court found that term limits are a “qualification for office” within the meaning of the statute and that the statute authorized the imposition of term limits.

Next, the plaintiffs argued that § 5-1-210(4) was unconstitutional under Article VII because Article VII granted only legislatures, not voters, the power to set term limits. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Article VII grants broad authority to the citizens of a county that goes so far as to allow the citizens to replace a county government. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that a chartered county may establish the qualifications for its own legislative body. The Court also noted that Article I of Tennessee’s constitution states that the people have an “unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.” Adopting the plaintiffs’ position they suggested would have required the Court to ignore the fundamental principle of self-government stated in Article I.

Finally, the plaintiffs cited Tennessee Attorney General opinions, debates from the Constitutional Convention of 1977, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-210(12) as authority that the positions of county officers could not be abolished nor could duties of the office be diminished. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the plaintiffs’ positions were not being either abolished or diminished. Because both the Tennessee Code and Tennessee Constitution permitted term limits for chartered counties, the Court denied the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the imposition of term limits.

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