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In Catholic Charities v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin rule limiting the availability of tax exemptions to religious charities “engaged in proselytization” or serving only their co-religionists violated the First Amendment. The core of the decision is the Establishment Clause’s bar on denominational discrimination. Because the Wisconsin law “differentiates between religions along theological lines” it is “textbook” discrimination. It must therefore satisfy strict scrutiny—which it cannot.

But the Court did not address the definition of religion itself. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was interpreting a provision calling for exempt charities to be “operated primarily for religious reasons.” The state court understandably felt the need to clarify what “religious reasons” are, and in doing so, it drew an unduly restrictive line. But the Supreme Court didn’t offer a different reading; instead, it said that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s reading is incompatible with the First Amendment per se.

The Court avoided this question by working from the specific to the general. Because some religions do tie their charitable work to proselytization and some don’t, a rule that treats them differently based on this choice is necessarily a denominational preference. In other words, the Court noted that the line Wisconsin drew runs between indisputably religious groups, not between the religious and the secular.

The Court did not set out a rule for what constitutes religious practice. Instead, it admitted that there may be hard cases down the line, but “this is not one.” Here, the Court was able to rely on the stated beliefs of large, recognized religious bodies. A harder question will arise if the Court is ever faced with a law that sides with almost all recognized religious bodies, but which burdens less familiar groups or even just one group. Take polygamy, for instance—banned by every major religious organization, but practiced by some smaller ones. Would a rule permitting a religious exemption only to those married to one spouse be considered “denominational preference”?

The Court is unlikely to take up such a question anytime soon. Lower courts will continue to encounter these claims, as they have since the rise of “cannabis churches” and other groups that seek unusual religious exemptions to general state and federal laws. Is a subjective “sincere religious belief” enough to qualify as a religion for First Amendment purposes? Or should the line be narrower? Perhaps it should be limited to a set of beliefs centered on “core” religious functions, such as worship, creed, and ethics. If anything, Catholic Charities inclines to the former, using undisputed testimony of sincere religious differences as evidence the state is drawing theological distinctions between religions. Whether the Court will actualize that principle fully remains to be seen.

The first signal of the reach of Catholic Charities has already come down: Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. Harris. New York has a similar rule to Wisconsin, allowing a religious exemption only for groups that serve or employ primarily co-religionists. The question in that case was slightly different, since it was raised under the Free Exercise Clause: is such a rule “neutral and generally applicable” under the 1990 Smith decision? On June 16, the Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision below, and remanded for consideration in light of Catholic Charities. This signal is clear: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause both require denominational neutrality. States would be wise to take notice.