Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

In Bullhead City, Arizona, on March 26, 1992, Danny Lee Jones and Robert Weaver engaged in a day of drinking and using crystal methamphetamine. A violent altercation ensued, resulting in Jones fatally striking Weaver with a baseball bat. Jones also attacked Weaver’s grandmother, Katherine Gumina, and his seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, the latter of whom he also strangled or suffocated. Jones fled to Las Vegas but was arrested and indicted in Arizona on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. His public defender, inexperienced in capital cases, received limited funding for expert witnesses. Jones was convicted on all counts, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled.

At sentencing, testimony revealed Jones’s troubled childhood, including substance abuse, head injuries, and abuse by his first stepfather. Dr. Jack Potts, a forensic psychiatrist, assessed Jones, citing a history of substance abuse, possible mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. Potts’s report, submitted late due to delayed receipt of the Presentence Information Report, suggested Jones’s impaired capacity to conform to the law at the time of the offenses. Despite a request for a continuance for further psychological testing, the judge found multiple aggravating factors for the murders and sentenced Jones to death for both murders and an additional twenty-five years for the attempted murder.

The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, and Jones filed a federal petition for habeas relief. After protracted litigation and appeals, the district court dismissed Jones’s habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that application of the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") meant that Jones was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.


Questions

  1. What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

Conclusions

  1. When a capital defendant claims that he was prejudiced at sentencing because counsel failed to present available mitigating evidence, a court must decide whether it is reasonably likely that the additional evidence would have avoided a death sentence, which the court does by evaluating the strength of all the evidence and comparing the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

    To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones needed to prove his counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced the outcome, meaning there was a reasonable probability that absent the errors, the sentencer would not have imposed the death penalty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit failed to properly apply this standard in three ways: (1) It did not adequately consider the serious aggravating circumstances in Jones’s case; (2) It applied an unsound rule prohibiting comparative analysis of expert testimony; and (3) It incorrectly suggested the sentencer cannot find mitigating evidence unpersuasive. Weighing the mitigating and aggravating evidence itself, the Court determined that most of Jones’s mitigating evidence was already presented in state court and the new evidence was not substantial. In contrast, the aggravating circumstances—multiple homicides, cruelty, financial motivation, and murder of a child—are given great weight under Arizona law. Past Arizona cases with similar aggravating factors resulted in the death penalty even with significant mitigating evidence. Therefore, there was no reasonable probability that Jones’s additional evidence would have changed the sentencing outcome.

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that while she agreed that the Ninth Circuit “all but ignored the strong aggravating circumstances in this case,” the majority “unnecessarily” reweighed the evidence itself rather than remanding it to the lower court to decide in the first instance.