Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the gambling.

In 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act ("2012 Act"), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events.

Five sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law ("2014 Law") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion of the panel.

Questions

Does a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of states in contravention of New York v. United States?

Conclusions

In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the court reversed in favor of the State of New Jersey, finding that PASPA's provision prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling schemes violates the anticommandeering doctrine under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution as interpreted under New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Pursuant to this authority, “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’"

In so holding, the Court explained that when a state fully or partially repeals old laws prohibiting sports gambling schemes, as New Jersey did in enacting the 2014 Law, it "authorizes" those schemes under PASPA. The Court also explained that there was no meaningful difference between directing a state legislature to enact a new law or prohibiting a state legislature from doing so, and PASPA's anti-authorization provision violated the anticommandeering principle because it specifically mandated what a state could and could not do. The Court stated that complying with the anticommandeering rule is important because it serves as one of the Constitution's structural safeguards of liberty, advances political accountability, and prevents Congress from shifting regulatory costs to the states.

The Court further held that no provision of PASPA is directly severable from those at issue in this case.

Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion as to all except Part VI-B, and filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and Justice Breyer joined in part.