In the evolving legal landscape of Second Amendment rights, the case of Barris v. Stroud Township[1] emerges as a significant judicial examination of the balance between individual gun rights and local government regulations.

Located in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, Stroud Township is subdivided into more than a dozen zoning and overlay districts.[2] In 2009, Jonathan Barris bought a 4.66-acre property in Stroud Township’s residential district. Barris’ property is adjoined by woods and a water feature to the north and by a commercial shopping center 400 feet to the south.[3] Barris built a personal outdoor shooting range on his property, and the neighbors made multiple complaints to the police about gunfire coming from Barris’ property.[4] 

On December 6, 2011, Stroud Township’s three-member Board of Supervisors enacted Ordinance No. 9-2011 (Discharge Ordinance),[5] which prohibited the discharging of firearms within the township. There were six exceptions included in the Ordinance, one of which was a shooting range exception. To qualify for the shooting range exception, a person needed to meet the zoning requirements of Ordinances 27-402 and 27-503 (Zoning Ordinances).[6] 

Barris did not qualify to build a shooting range pursuant to the Zoning Ordinances since his property was located in a residential district, where shooting ranges are prohibited.[7] Barris filed a request for a zoning permit to build a shooting range, but his request was denied.[8] Barris next sought declaratory relief in Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, claiming that his Second Amendment rights were being violated.[9] Barris contended that such restrictions infringed upon his Second Amendment rights, particularly his ability to shoot on his own land for self-defense training.[10]

The county court dismissed his complaint, but the Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, reversed the county court’s decision in part and remanded the case to the trial court.[11]

The trial court granted the Township’s second motion for summary judgment. Barris appealed, and the Commonwealth Court again found in his favor, holding that the Discharge Ordinance was facially unconstitutional. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal. The Township argued that the instant case was distinguishable from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen.[12] The Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief, which contended that the issue before the court was whether individuals have the right to set up shooting ranges at all private residences.[13]

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Discharge Ordinance was facially constitutional.[14] Justice Doherty delivered the opinion of the court and was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Todd and Justice Wecht.[15]

The court reiterated the two-step analysis from Bruen:

When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.[16]

For the first step of the Bruen analysis, the court found that that Second Amendment’s plain text applied, as Barris risked having his handguns confiscated if he violated the demands of the ordinance.[17] For the second step of the Bruen analysis, the court said that it had “combed [one] hundred-plus purported historical analogues . . . and [that its] painstaking review confirms the Township’s discharge ordinance is fully consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”[18]

Justice Donohue filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. He agreed with the majority’s conclusion but disagreed with its application of the Bruen test. He argued that the majority erred in the threshold inquiry in focusing on the penalty for violating the ordinance (gun confiscation) rather than the “purportedly protected conduct.”[19] According to Justice Donohue, “[t]he problem with the Majority’s analysis is that the right it selected for the threshold inquiry—the right to keep and bear arms—is totally disconnected from the right it examines in conducting its historical analysis—firearm regulations limiting the place where firearms may be discharged.”[20]

Justice Mundy filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Discharge Ordinance violated the Second Amendment.[21] She disagreed with the majority opinion’s application of both prongs of the Bruen test, noting its inadequate and misapplied historical analysis as well as its selective use of precedents.[22]

Justice Brobson did not participate in the case.[23]

The majority opinion concluded with a pointed critique of the Bruen decision itself.[24] The court expressed concerns about the difficulties and potential inconsistencies in applying Bruen's historical analysis framework to modern firearm regulations. The justices noted that requiring contemporary courts to comb through centuries-old laws to determine the constitutionality of current regulations places an impractical burden on the judiciary. They emphasized that such an approach risks selective use of historical precedents and may lead to varying interpretations, undermining the consistency and predictability of Second Amendment jurisprudence.[25] This criticism underscores the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's dim view of Bruen's methodology, particularly its detailed historical analysis, and will have considerable import for future legal decisions concerning gun rights and regulations.

 

[1] 310 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2024).

[2] Id. at 190.      

[3] Id. at 191.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 192. See also Twp. Stroud, PA., Municipal Code ch. 6, § 6-101, available at https://ecode360.com/33067965#33067966.

[6] Barris, 310 A.3d at 193.

[7] Id. at 195.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 196.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 198-99. See generally N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

[13] Barris, 310 A.3d at 199.

[14] Id. at 214-15.

[15] Id. at 215.

[16] Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.

[17] Barris, 310 A.3d at 206-07.

[18] Id. at 208.

[19] Id. at 217.

[20] Id. at 221.

[21] Id. at 222.

[22] Id. at 224, 225-26.

[23] Id. at 215.

[24] Id.

[25] Id at 189-90.

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