In Commonwealth v. Canjura,[1] the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether the state's prohibition on carrying switchblade knives violated the Second Amendment. Applying the framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen,[2] the Massachusetts court concluded that the ban could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.[3]

The case originated with the arrest of David Canjura, who was found in possession of a spring-assisted knife, known as a switchblade, during an altercation. Canjura challenged the state's ban on possessing switchblades,[4] arguing that switchblades are "arms" protected by the Second Amendment.[5] The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied the two-step test set forth in Bruen. First, it examined whether a switchblade qualifies as an "arm" under the Second Amendment. The court concluded that, as a type of folding pocketknife, the switchblade meets the definition of a bearable arm.[6] The court stated, "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding."[7]

In the second part of the analysis, the Commonwealth needed to demonstrate that its prohibition was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of arms regulation.[8] The court found that Massachusetts failed to meet this burden, noting that the historical regulations cited by the Commonwealth involved different types of weapons and were not applicable to folding knives or switchblades specifically.[9] Moreover, a number of the historical regulations cited by the Commonwealth dated back only to the mid-20th century, which the court emphasized  “have, at best, marginal evidentiary value" for evaluating modern arms under the Bruen framework.[10]

The Commonwealth also argued that switchblades are "dangerous and unusual" weapons, and thus fall outside the scope of Second Amendment protection.[11] However, the court rejected this argument, noting that switchblades are "in common use" today, with only seven states and the District of Columbia categorically banning them.[12] The court concluded that switchblades do not possess qualities that make them disproportionately dangerous compared to other legally protected arms used for self-defense.[13]

The ruling in Canjura expands the application of Second Amendment protections beyond firearms, affirming that other forms of bearable arms—including switchblades—are also protected. By adhering to the analytical framework of Bruen, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reinforced the idea that modern arms must be evaluated in light of their historical analogues.[14] This decision provides a significant precedent for future litigation involving the Second Amendment and non-firearm bearable arms. The decision also reiterates that constitutional rights extend beyond historical weapons like muskets and flintlocks, adapting to modern needs for self-defense.[15]

The court’s detailed historical analysis shows that left-leaning judges are able to properly apply originalist methods required by binding precedent. The court's analysis aligns with the reasoning in District of Columbia v. Heller,[16] which emphasized the centrality of self-defense in Second Amendment rights, and in Bruen, which set forth the historical analogue method of evaluating Second Amendment challenges.[17]

In Commonwealth v. Canjura, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has provided clarity on the application of Second Amendment protections to non-firearm bearable arms, illustrating the adaptability of constitutional rights in the face of evolving societal norms.

[1] 240 N.E.3d 213 (Mass. 2024).

[2] 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

[3] Canjura, 240 N.E.3d at 216.

[4] Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10(b) (2024).

[5] Id. at 217.

[6] Id. at 218-19.

[7] Id. at 217 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008)).

[8] Id. at 219.

[9] Id. at 219-20.

[10] Id. at 220 n.9.

[11] Id. at 220.

[12] Id. at 221.

[13] Id. at 222.

[14] Id. at 222.

[15] See id. at 217 (citing  Heller, 554 U.S. at 582).

 

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