ORDER LIST: 1 new grant 

Kingdomware Techs v. US: Whether the Federal Circuit erred in construing 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d)'s mandatory set-aside restricting competition for Department of Veterans Affairs' contracts to veteran-owned small businesses as discretionary.


(1) Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment: In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that Stare decisis requires this Court to adhere to its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. Per Justice Kagan, "The doctrine of stare decisis provides that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions. Application of that doctrine, though 'not an inexorable command,' is the 'preferred course. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828, 827. Overruling a case always requires 'special justification'—over and above the belief  'that the precedent was wrongly decided.' Where, as here, the precedent interprets a statute, stare decisis carries enhanced force, since critics are free to take their objections to Congress. See e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172–173. Congress, moreover, has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte, see Watson v. United States, 552 U. S. 74, 82–83, and has even rebuffed bills that would have replaced Brulotte’s per se rule with the standard Kimble urges. In addition, Brulotte implicates property and contract law, two contexts in which considerations favoring stare decisis are “at their acme,” Payne, 501 U. S., at 828, because parties are especially likely to rely on such precedents when ordering their affairs. Given those good reasons for adhering to stare decisis in this case, this Court would need a very strong justification for overruling Brulotte."

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. 

(2) Los Angeles v. Patel: In a 5-4 decision delvered by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that facial challenges can be brought under the Fourth Amendment and that Section 41.49(3)(a) (An LA ordinance that requires hotel operators to record and keep specific information about their guests on the premises for a 90-day period and requires them to make this information available for police inspection) is facially unconstitutional because it fails to provide hotel operators with an opportunity for precompliance review. Per Justice Sotomayor, "the Court has held that absent consent, exigent circumstances, or the like, in order for an administrative search to be constitutional, the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker. See See, 387 U. S., at 545; Lone Steer, 464 U. S., at 415 (noting that an administrative search may proceed with only a subpoena where the subpoenaed party is sufficiently protected by the opportunity to “question the reasonableness of the subpoena, before suffering any penalties for refusing to comply with it, by raising objections in an action in district court”). And, we see no reason why this minimal requirement is inapplicable here. While the Court has never attempted to prescribe the exact form an opportunity for precompliance review must take, the City does not even attempt to argue that §41.49(3)(a) affords hotel operators any opportunity whatsoever. Section 41.49(3)(a) is, therefore, facially invalid."

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. 

(3) Kingsley v. Hendrickson: Justice Breyer delivered the opinions of the Court. In a vote of 5-4, the Court held that, under Section 1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable to prevail on an excessive force claim. Per Justice Breyer, "Several considerations have led us to conclude that the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one. For one thing, it is consistent with our precedent...For another thing, experience suggests that an objective standard is workable....Finally, the use of an objective standard adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith."

Scalia dissents, joined by Chief and Thomas, and Alito dissents as well. The decision of the Seventh Circuit is vacated and remanded. 

(4) Horne v. Department of Agriculture: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. In a vote of 8-1, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. Per Chief Justice Roberts, "The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred from the grower to the Government. Title to the raisins passes to the Raisin Committee. The Committee disposes of those raisins as it wishes, to promote the purposes of the raisin marketing order. The Government’s formal demand that the Hornes turn over a percentage of their raisin crop without charge, for the Government’s control and use, is 'of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.'"

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the opinion of the Court. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was reversed.