SCOTUS Opinions: 12/8/2015
Note from the Editor: The Federalist Society takes no positions on particular legal and public policy matters. Any expressions of opinion are those of the author. We welcome responses to the views presented here. To join the debate, please email us at [email protected].
Today the Court released one opinion:
In the case of Shapiro v. McManus, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed and the case remanded by a vote of 9-0. Per Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court:
We consider under what circumstances, if any, a district judge is free to 'determin[e] that three judges are not required' for an action 'challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.' 28 U. S. C. §§2284(a), (b)(1)....In Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973), we stated that the filing of a 'constitutionally insubstantial' claim did not trigger the three-judge-court requirement under the pre-1976 statutory regime....Absent a substantial federal question, even a single-judge district court lacks jurisdiction, and '[a] three-judge court is not required where the district court itself lacks jurisdiction of the complaint or the complaint is not justiciable in the federal courts.' Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 100 (1974). In the present case, however, the District Judge dismissed petitioners’ complaint not because he thought he lacked jurisdiction, but because he concluded that the allegations failed to state a claim for relief on the merits.... We think this standard both too demanding and inconsistent with our precedents. '[C]onstitutional claims will not lightly be found insubstantial for purposes of' the three-judge-court statute....Whatever 'wholly insubstantial,' 'obviously frivolous,' etc., mean, at a minimum they cannot include a plea for relief based on a legal theory put forward by a Justice of this Court and uncontradicted by the majority in any of our cases. Accordingly, the District Judge should not have dismissed the claim as “constitutionally insubstantial” under Goosby. Perhaps petitioners will ultimately fail on the merits of their suit, but §2284 entitles them to make their case before a three-judge district court. (emphasis added)
Assistant Director, Practice Groups, The Federalist Society
Partner, Jones Day
Kevin Marshall provides clients analysis, strategy, and advocacy involving novel or complex legal issues, particularly in white collar and other compliance matters and in civil litigation arising out of criminal matters or alleged fraud. This includes appeals, dispositive and other critical motions, and prelitigation analyses.
Kevin oversaw trial and appellate briefing, and argued on appeal, in the successful defense of lawsuits arising out of the wiretapping prosecution of a private investigator who had served Jones Day's clients. He also has overseen briefing of, and successfully argued, motions for R.J. Reynolds in connection with arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, and the partial settlement, of billion dollar disputes with states under the Master Settlement Agreement. His assistance with investigations and related litigation has included the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, false claims acts, RICO, civil and criminal fraud, reckless manslaughter, and the intersection of products liability and bankruptcy. Kevin was part of the team representing the National Federation of Independent Business in challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act before the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court. He also has advised on and briefed issues under the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA).
Before joining Jones Day, Kevin was a deputy assistant attorney general in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. He provided authoritative written legal opinions and other legal advice, throughout the executive branch, on the Constitution, treaties, international law including the law of war, and federal statutes and regulations. He also testified three times before Congress.