United States v. Lovett

In 1943, the respondents, Lovett, Watson, and Dodd, were, and had been for several years, working for the Government. The government agencies which had lawfully employed them were fully satisfied with the quality of their work, and wished to keep them employed on their jobs. Over the protest of those employing agencies, Congress provided in § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, by way of an amendment attached to the House bill, that, after November 15, 1943, no salary or compensation should be paid respondents out of any monies then or thereafter appropriated except for services as jurors or members of the armed forces, unless they were, prior to November 15, 1943, again appointed to jobs by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. [ Footnote 1 ] 57 Stat. 431, 450. Notwithstanding the congressional enactment, and the failure of the President to reappoint respondents, the agencies kept all the respondents at work on their jobs for varying periods after November 15, 1943; but their compensation was discontinued after that date. To secure compensation for this post-November 15th work, respondents brought these actions in the Court of Claims. They urged that § 304 is unconstitutional and void on the grounds that: (1) The section, properly interpreted, shows a congressional purpose to exercise the power to remove executive employees, a power not entrusted to Congress, but to the Executive Branch of Government under Article II, § 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Constitution; (2) the section violates Article I, § 9, Clause 3, of the Constitution, which provides that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"; (3) the section violates the Fifth Amendment, in that it singles out these three respondents and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law. The Solicitor General, appearing for the Government, joined in the first two of respondents' contentions, but took no position on the third. House Resolution 386, 89 Cong.Rec. 10882, and Joint Resolution No. 230, 78th Congress, 58 Stat. 113, authorized a special counsel to appear on behalf of the Congress. This counsel denied all three of respondents' contentions. He urged that § 304 was a valid exercise of congressional power under Article I, § 8, Clause 1; § 8, Clause 18, and § 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution, which sections empower Congress "To lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," and provide that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . ." Counsel for Congress also urged that § 304 did not purport to terminate respondents' employment. According to him, it merely cut off respondents' pay, and deprived governmental agencies of any power to make enforceable contracts with respondents for any further compensation. The contention was that this involved simply an exercise of congressional powers over appropriations, which, according to the argument, are plenary, and not subject to judicial review. On this premise, counsel for Congress urged that the challenge of the constitutionality of § 304 raised no justiciable controversy. The Court of Claims entered judgments in favor of respondents. Some of the judges were of the opinion that § 304, properly interpreted, did not terminate respondents' employment, but only prohibited payment of compensation out of funds generally appropriated, and that, consequently, the continued employment of respondents was valid, and justified their bringing actions for pay in the Court of Claims. Other members of the Court thought § 304 unconstitutional and void, either as a bill of attainder, an encroachment on exclusive executive authority, or a denial of due process. 104 Ct.Cls. 557, 66 F. Supp. 142. We granted certiorari because of the manifest importance of the questions involved.