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Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

Patrick Thompson took out three loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings between 2011 and 2014, totaling $219,000. In late 2017, Washington Federal failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became its receiver, hiring Planet Home Lending to service the loans. Thompson received an invoice showing a loan balance of $269,120.58, which included interest.

In subsequent phone calls with Planet Home and FDIC contractors in February and March 2018, Thompson disputed the higher balance. He acknowledged borrowing money but claimed he had only borrowed $110,000, omitting mention of the two additional loans. When the contractors found out about Thompson’s 2013 and 2014 loans shortly thereafter, they called Thompson back on March 5, 2018, he again expressed doubt over the accuracy of the higher loan balance. Eventually, Thompson and the FDIC agreed to settle his debt for $219,000—the amount Thompson owed without interest in December 2018.

In April 2021, a grand jury charged Thompson with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014—a statute that criminalizes making a “false statement . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of the FDIC or a mortgage lending business. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Thompson of both counts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.


Questions

  1. Does the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?

Conclusions

  1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

    The term “false” in § 1014 means “not true,” excluding statements that are misleading but factually accurate. The statute does not use the word “misleading,” even though Congress has included that term in other statutes when intending to criminalize deceptive but true statements. Because misleading statements are sometimes true, they do not fit within § 1014’s prohibition on “false statements.” The statutory context confirms this interpretation, as a broad reading that includes misleading statements would render other statutes’ use of both “false” and “misleading” redundant.

    Precedent further supports this distinction. The Court in United States v. Wells concluded that § 1014 does not have an unwritten materiality requirement because Congress did not include that term in the statute. Similarly, § 1014 does not encompass misleading statements simply because they might deceive. The Court rejected the government’s reliance on Kay v. United States, explaining that Kay primarily discussed false statements made with intent to mislead, not statements that were misleading but true. Because neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit determined whether Thompson’s statements were false, the Court remanded for further proceedings on that issue.