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Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

A New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway. Roger Belton was a passenger in that car. When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana. The officer also found that none of the car’s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car. After asking the four occupants of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside one of the pockets.

At trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted.


Questions

  1. May an officer lawfully search a car without a warrant after the occupants are separated from the vehicle and under arrest?

Conclusions

  1. Yes. In a 6-3 vote, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court rejected the previously used case-by-case analysis for whether a search is reasonable in favor of a bright line rule. The Court held that a police officer can always lawfully search a car and any compartments in that car after arresting its occupants. The search in this case was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, stating that he joined in the opinion because the majority was unwilling to overturn Mapp v. Ohio, which held that evidence obtained in unlawful searches and seizures cannot be used in criminal prosecutions. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement clearly gave the police officer authority to conduct the search in this case.

    Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the bright line rule adopted by the majority was a departure from prior precedent. He argued that a clear rule will not provide officers in the field with any greater guidance about what searches are permissible. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the new rule permits officers to search luggage, briefcases, or other containers in a car without a warrant or any suspicion that they contain relevant evidence. Justice Marshall also joined in this dissent.