Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents.

Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context.


Questions

  1. Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?

Conclusions

  1. Federal courts have no authority to create new causes of action for violations of international human rights law under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) does not allow lawsuits against individuals who assist others in committing torture rather than committing it directly. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

    The ATS, enacted in 1789, gives federal courts jurisdiction—the power to hear cases—over lawsuits by foreign nationals alleging violations of international law. The statute grants only jurisdiction; it does not itself create any right to sue. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Court left open a narrow possibility that courts could recognize new claims based on well-established international norms, but subsequent legal developments close that door permanently. Two principles control. First, every ATS case implicates foreign policy by design, because such a suit aims to vindicate an international norm, and courts cannot safely conclude that any newly created claim would avoid harmful foreign-policy consequences. Under current doctrine, even a single sound reason to believe Congress would not want courts to invent a new remedy requires courts to refrain—a threshold that every ATS case meets. Second, the Constitution expressly delegates to Congress the authority to "define and punish Offences against the Law of Nations," making legislatively created claims the constitutionally proper vehicle for this area. The TVPA—Congress's own targeted remedy for torture victims—confirms that Congress, not courts, controls when federal courthouse doors open for international human rights claims.

    On the TVPA, the statute allows a lawsuit against someone who "subjects" another person to torture. That word demands a direct causal connection: to "subject" someone means to cause them to undergo something. Aiding and abetting—helping another person commit a wrong rather than committing it yourself—covers people one or more steps removed from the torturer, a broader reach than the statute's language supports. Congress expressly includes aiding-and-abetting language in other statutes when it wants that coverage, and the TVPA's silence on the point settles the question.

    Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, agreeing that the TVPA does not reach aiding-and-abetting claims but disagreeing with the majority's total elimination of court-recognized ATS causes of action and its use of Central Bank as a rigid requirement that Congress deploy specific "magic words" to authorize aiding-and-abetting liability.

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to most parts, arguing that the majority effectively overruled Sosa without acknowledging it, that Sosa's two-step framework remained sound and workable, and that the TVPA's word "subjects" naturally covers those who culpably participate in another person's torture.