Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton were each denied benefits despite evidence that appeared to be in “approximate balance.” The benefit-of-the-doubt rule, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” However, in reviewing the Veterans Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 7261(b)(1), which requires the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule “does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond” performing the usual review of the underlying factual findings for clear error—a basic procedural requirement that was already in place before enactment of the Veterans Benefits Act.

Questions

  1. Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1)?

Conclusions

  1. The Department of Veterans Affairs’ determination that evidence regarding a disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a factual determination subject to clear-error review by the Veterans Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

    The statute at issue, 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1), requires the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. This provision does not establish a new standard of review but instead directs the Veterans Court to review such determinations under the standards in §7261(a), which provides for de novo review of legal questions and clear-error review of factual findings. Determining whether evidence is in approximate balance involves both legal and factual components, as the VA must marshal and weigh evidence while also applying the legal “approximate balance” standard. Because this determination is primarily factual, clear-error review is appropriate.

    Petitioners argued that the Veterans Court should review the "approximate balance" determination de novo, comparing it to judicial review of probable-cause determinations, but this analogy is flawed. The probable-cause inquiry involves substantial legal reasoning and constitutional concerns, whereas the VA’s assessment of evidence balance is specific to each case and lacks broader legal implications. The statute's language does not support imposing de novo review, nor does the canon against surplusage justify a different reading. 

    Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined.