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A recent California decision respecting the reach of that state’s motion for reconsideration rule presented some important developments regarding the nature of judicial power. The decision offers perspectives on both the scope of judicial independence in a system of separated powers and the power of courts to “reform” legislative language in lieu of striking the offending text. 

A California appellate court declined to apply the express language of a state statute that precluded motions for reconsideration, while simultaneously refusing to hold the statute unconstitutional. In 1990, the Scott Company of California filed suit for damages arising from the construction of the San Jose Convention Center. Scott named as defendants the general contractor on the project, and three sureties that issued bonds to the general contractor. Protracted litigation followed, eventually leading Scott to seek the removal of the trial judge. While Scott’s removal request was pending, the sureties filed a motion for summary judgment, which the judge denied. Soon after, the trial judge voluntarily withdrew from the case, and the matter was reassigned.

Following reassignment, the sureties moved for reconsideration under the California Code of Civil Procedure. The sureties argued that the removal proceedings interfered with their ability to support their initial motion, and prohibited them from demonstrating that a provision of the California Civil Code prohibited Scott’s claim. Significantly, the sureties did not argue that the substantive grounds for their motion were “new or different law” as required under Section 1008 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Despite this deficiency, the trial court agreed with the sureties argument, granted the motion for reconsideration, and entered summary judgment against the plaintiff. 

On appeal, Scott argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court agreed that the sureties failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for reconsideration under Section 1008(a), because the authorities raised in the motion were not new or different law. 

Scott then argued that pursuant to Section 1008(e), the trial court’s ruling was impermissible. Section 1008(e), the appellate court explained, expressly provides that “[n]o application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” Therefore, Scott asserted, because the sureties failed to comply with subsection (a), subsection (e) compelled reversal as the trial court had no jurisdiction to reconsider the motion for summary judgment. 

The appellate court recognized that Section 1008(e) was intended to revise the prior practice of allowing courts to reconsider their rulings on any grounds. The appellate court concluded that given the express language of subdivision (e), “there can be no question that the legislative changes . . . were intended to make the procedural requirements of section 1008 exclusive and jurisdictional.” 

The appellate court then observed that California courts have the inherent power to insure the orderly administration of justice, a power that derives from the California Constitution. The court also noted that under the state constitution, the resolution of specific controversies is considered a “core” or “essential” function of the judiciary that may not be usurped by another branch. Thus, although the legislature may regulate the practices and procedures of the courts, it may not “defeat or materially impair” the essential functions of the judiciary. Based on this reasoning, the court agreed that the jurisdictional limitation of subdivision (e) constituted an impermissible interference with the core functions of the courts. The appellate court explained that depriving a court of jurisdiction to reconsider its own rulings would create a significant impediment to fair and expeditious adjudication. The court also declined to interpret subdivision (e) as discretionary, because the provision “makes absolutely clear the intent” of the legislature to limit the courts’ powers. For these reasons, the court concluded, subdivision (e) appeared to be unconstitutional. 

Nonetheless, the court stated that “we believe that reformation is a viable alternative to declaring the provision unconstitutional.” Using the legislature’s stated intent of discouraging repetitious litigation as a guide, the appellate court reasoned that Section 1008 should be reformed to allow motions for reconsideration where judicial resources would be conserved. In this case, concluding that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the summary judgment motion would result in “any number of motions for judgment in various forms before, during, and after trial.” Therefore, by reconsidering the motion at this “early stage” in the case, the trial court obviated the need for further litigation, and fulfilled the legislatures’ intent. For these reasons, the appellate court declined to hold Section 1008 unconstitutional, and instead held that the motion for reconsideration was a proper exercise of the trial court’s constitutionally independent authority. 

The case is Scott Co. of California v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 197 (2003).

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