This Teleforum explores the foundation for Chevron deference to agency statutory interpretation, and the implications of that foundation. In particular, it considers whether the Supreme Court’s justification of Chevron as deriving from an implicit delegation of interpretive primacy to an agency within the context of taking action with the force of law is justifiable. It also considers whether a better justification is the implicit constraint inherent in Article III of the Constitution that courts should avoid engaging in policy decisionmaking to the extent possible when performing their judicial functions. It goes on to consider the implications of these two different justifications for Chevron, potentially addressing the applicability of Chevron to actions that do not carry the force of law (i.e. Chevron’s step zero), Chevron’s major question exception, the appropriate judicial inquiry at step two of Chevron, and perhaps even the extent to which Congress can override the Chevron doctrine as a canon of statutory interpretation.
- Mark Seidenfeld, Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State University College of Law