Facts of the Case
In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity.
Questions
Does a district court judge have the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, which makes him immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error?
Conclusions
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Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the law vested the district court judge with the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, and he is therefore immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. The Court held that a judge could only be deprived of immunity when he acted in clear absence of jurisdiction. In this case, the court had general jurisdiction over the petition for sterilization, therefore, Judge Stump’s approval was a judicial act, and he was immunized from liability.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, in which he argued that the scope of judicial immunity was a limited liability for judicial acts. Because approval of a petition for sterilization is not a function normally performed by a judge, it is not a judicial act. In a separate dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that a judicial officer acted in a manner that precluded all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies and that the judge should not be entitled to immunity.
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.
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