Facts of the Case
Jim Skidmore and other employees of the Swift & Company packing plant in Fort Worth, Texas were all firemen, elevator operators, or relief firemen who worked eight hours per week, for which they were paid normally. They also spent three-and-a-half to four nights per week in the fire hall, where they were on-call in case of an alarm; however, they were only paid for time spent actually responding to an alarm. The fire hall was equipped with heated and air-conditioned sleeping quarters, along with the equipment for various recreational activities, such as pool, dominoes, etc. The plaintiffs could sleep or be otherwise engaged during the time they spent in the fire hall as long as they were available should there be an alarm. The plaintiffs sued Swift & Company under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and argued that they should be compensated for the time spent in the fire hall even when not directly answering an alarm. They sought to recover around $77,000 in overtime costs, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees. The trial court found that the time spent in the fire hall did not constitute work under the FLSA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Questions
Does the time the plaintiffs spent in the fire hall constitute work under the Fair Labor Standards Act?
Conclusions
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Yes. Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered the case for the unanimous Court. The Court held that there was no reason that time spent waiting could not also be time spent working, especially in cases in which the conditions of employment involve waiting time. Although it can be difficult to determine the facts of a case and whether the activity in question constitutes work, Congress granted the courts the authority to do so. In this case, the Court held that the decisions in the lower courts were based on an erroneous understanding of the law that classified waiting time as wholly separate from working time, so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
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