Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida

Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

Fane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the “City”), where he was a vocal critic of the City’s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate the City’s approval of the plan due to insufficient public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman’s claim.

On November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember’s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest Lozman.

Lozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely.

In February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.

On appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury’s finding of probable cause on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law.

The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the district court’s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury’s probable cause finding defeated Lozman’s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the lower court’s jury instructions regarding the City’s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues.

Questions

Does the establishment of probable cause defeat a claim of retaliatory-arrest under the First Amendment as a matter of law?

Conclusions

Ruling 8-1, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case.

In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court explained that its holding in this case was narrow. Lozman had conceded that probable cause for his arrest existed, but claimed that his arrest was in retaliation for his earlier protected speech, which took the form of an open-meetings lawsuit and public criticisms of city officials. However, the parties disagreed as to what standard should govern the allegations of retaliatory arrest. Lozman argued that the applicable precedent was Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), a civil case in which a teacher alleged retaliatory employment action in violation of his First Amendment rights, and the Court held that the employer could not be liable unless the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause of the employment termination. The City argued that Mt. Healthy should not provide the sole standard in this case, and that instead Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), a criminal case which held that a plaintiff alleging retaliatory prosecution must show the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal charge, should govern the case. But the Court responded that the question of what precedent applied to this issue need not be decided in a broad sense given that the facts of this case were so unusual in the retaliatory arrest context.

Indeed, Lozman did not sue the officer who made the arrest, and likely could not have succeeded on a retaliatory arrest claim against him as the officer seemed to have acted in good faith, and there was no indication that he had any knowledge of Lozman’s prior lawsuit or criticisms of the local government. Instead, Lozman alleged that city officials had implemented an official policy of intimidation against him due to his lawsuit and public statements criticizing them, and that their premeditated plan culminated in his arrest at the city council meeting. Further, in order for the city to be subject to liability under § 1983, Lozman would need to prove that he suffered harm as a result of an “official municipal policy,” distinguishing his claim from most cases alleging retaliatory arrest, which often involve on-the-spot judgements by individual police officers.

Given the uniqueness of this case in the retaliatory arrest context, along with the core First Amendment values at stake, the Court held that Lozman did not need to prove the absence of probable cause to maintain his retaliatory arrest claim. The Court also concluded that Mt. Healthy was the proper standard for assessing the retaliatory arrest claim on remand under these particular facts, but declined to address the requirements for proving such a claim in other contexts. The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.