Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry’s car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away.

Graham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry’s car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham’s vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident.

Graham filed § 1983 charges against Connor, other officers, and the City of Charlotte, alleging a violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers, unlawful assault, unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed for a directed verdict, which the district court granted. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, contending that the district court incorrectly applied a four-part substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick that takes into account officers’ “good faith” efforts and whether they acted “maliciously or sadistically”. He instead argued for a standard of “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected this argument, reasoning that concepts such as "good faith" are relevant to determining the degree of force used. It affirmed the directed verdict, holding that a reasonable jury could not have found in Graham’s favor.


Questions

  1. (1) Must Graham show that the police acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” to establish his claim that Charlotte police used excessive force?

    (2) Must Graham’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force be examined under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard?

Conclusions

  1. No and yes. In a unanimous ruling written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that claims of excessive force used by government officials are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. The Court vacated the directed verdict and remanded the case to the district court to be decided by that standard.

    Rehnquist noted that § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Rather, the Fourth Amendment stands as one of the two primary sources of protection against physically abusive government conduct, along with the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the validity of Graham’s claim must be judged by reference to the specific rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, not by a generalized “excessive force” standard.

    Justice Rehnquist rejected Connor’s argument that “malicious and sadistic” is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable, noting that the subjective motivations of the officers are relevant under the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth. Rather, he explained that the “objective reasonableness” of a use of force should be judged by the perspective of an officer on the scene, and should take into account factors such as the severity of the crime, the threat posed by the suspect, and any attempts by the suspect to resist or evade arrest.

    Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall concurred, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun argued that there was not sufficient precedent to hold that claims of use of excessive force will never be subject to Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process review.