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Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.

Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

On January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors focused on MCFL’s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote ‘pro-life’, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL’s views.

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, holding that the flyers did not fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and that the flyers fell under the act’s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied.

After examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and did not fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court’s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.

Questions

  1. Did Massachusetts Citizens for Life violate the Federal Election Campaign Act by distributing flyers asking voters to vote “for life” paid for with treasury funds?

    Does that section of FECA violate the First Amendment as applied?

Conclusions

  1. Yes and yes. In an opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, the Court held unanimously that Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s flyers violated FECA’s prohibition on expenditures. He pointed to the general definitions section of FECA, where ‘expenditures’ included the provision of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Justice Brennan also looked to the legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend to abandon its restrictions on expenditures to support candidates. Justice Brennan rejected MCFL’s argument that it did not expressly advocate for a candidate, noting that the flyers exhorted readers to vote for specific ‘pro-life’ candidates.

    In a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan also held that FECA was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL’s flyers. While acknowledging that FECA’s requirements were not an absolute restriction on MCFL’s First Amendment rights, he argued that they were a substantial restriction. He noted that MCFL was forced to comply with several burdensome requirements only because it was a corporation; these requirements potentially created a disincentive for engaging in political speech. Justice Brennan held that the state’s compelling interest in restricting corporate spending on elections did not extend to MCFL because 1) MCFL was formed for an exclusively political purpose, 2) it had no shareholders, and 3) it was not formed by a business corporation or labor union. He noted that even if FECA’s disclosure requirements no longer applied, MCFL was still required to identify anyone contributing over $200.

    Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred with both of the majority’s holdings. She emphasized that the significant burden on MCFL arose from FECA’s additional organizational restrictions, and not from its higher disclosure requirements.

    Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, dissented on the constitutionality of FECA. While acknowledging that the threat from corporate political activity varied depending on the characteristics of a particular corporation, he argued that these were distinctions in degree and not differences in kind. He described the majority’s three-part test as legislative in character.