Bounds v. Smith

Facts of the Case

Provided by Oyez

The North Carolina Department of Correction (“DoC”) had custody of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed in 80 prison units in 67 different counties. The only unit having a writ room and some semblance of a legal library was the Central Prison in Raleigh. Robert Smith, Donald W. Morgan, and John Harrington were all inmates in the DoC’s custody. In consolidated cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the state of North Carolina failed to provide its prisoners with proper legal facilities. They argued that this violated their right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering the responsible state officials to submit a proposed plan to provide library facilities for the use of indigent prisoners seeking to file pro se habeas or civil rights actions, or to provide some acceptable substitute. The court suggested that the state could fulfill its obligations by making legal counsel or assistance available, but did not mandate this approach. In response, the state proposed to construct seven new law libraries within the prison system, to expand the facilities at Central Prison, and to provide all inmates with access to these libraries upon request.

The plaintiffs protested that the plan was inadequate, but the court rejected their objections. It held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but held that the plan failed to provide female prisoners with the same access as male prisoners.

Questions

Did the First and Fourteenth Amendments require the North Carolina Department of Corrections to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of legal papers by providing adequate law libraries or adequate legal assistance?

Conclusions

Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the constitution required the North Carolina Department of Correction to provide prisoners with legal assistance as part of prisoners’ right of access to the courts. Justice Marshall emphasized that prisoners have a well-established right of adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts. He wrote that this access generally required states to shoulder affirmative obligations to provide meaningful access, including paying for trial counsel for indigent clients.

Justice Marshall acknowledged that habeas corpus and civil rights complaints only needed to set forth facts giving rise to the complaint, but rejected North Carolina’s argument that law libraries or legal assistance were not essential to frame those complaints. A typical client would expect any lawyer preparing either complaint to research the law to determine whether an actionable claim existed. Justice Marshall rejected the state’s argument that inmates were ill-equipped to use the tools of the trade of the legal profession.

Justice Marshall also rejected North Carolina’s interpretation of Ross v. Moffitt, where the Court held that prisoners’ right to appointed counsel in appeals to criminal cases was limited. Here, the Court was concerned with prisoners seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights. Justice Marshall noted that adequate law libraries were only one constitutionally acceptable method of assuring meaningful access to the courts. Finally, he rejected the state’s argument that the district court exceeded its powers by ordering North Carolina to devise a remedy for the violation.

Justice Louis Powell concurred, emphasizing that the majority’s holding did not pass on the kinds of claims that state or federal courts were constitutionally required to hear.

Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He could not determine the source of the constitutional right of access to the courts, or of the requirement that the states foot the bill for assuring that access for prisoners. Chief Justice Burger noted that the right of prisoners to collaterally attack convictions was derived from federal statutes and not from the constitution itself.

Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He characterized the majority’s opinion as a reiteration of the reasoning in Younger v. Gilmore, where the Court also failed to identify a constitutional source for prisoners’ right of access to the courts. He emphasized that lawful imprisonment properly resulted in a retraction of prisoners' rights.