Facts of the Case
On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data.
At trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.
Questions
Does the state’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence constitute a denial of due process?
Conclusions
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No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police to prove that the loss or destruction of evidence was a denial of due process. Requiring the police to retain every potentially useful piece of evidence places an undue burden on the police, while the bad faith restriction limits the police’s duty to what serves the interests of justice. The Court also held that, in this case, the police’s failure to refrigerate the clothing could at worst be negligent, but not in bad faith.
In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, even without the Court’s ruling, the state has a strong interest in properly preserving as much evidence as possible. He also argued that there was no way to definitively say what the evidence might have shown and the jury still ruled in favor of the prosecution, which suggests that the evidence would not have been sufficient to exonerate Youngblood. Justice Stevens also argued that, while he concurred in the judgment, he found the majority’s opinion much broader than necessary to decide this case.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, regardless of the state’s intent, police action that results in the defendant’s failure to receive a fair trial represents a denial of due process. He also argued that there is no bright-line distinction between good faith and bad faith police action, and therefore that guideline does not adequately protect the rights of criminal defendants. Without any way to know what the evidence would have shown, there is no proof that it would not have been enough to exonerate Youngblood, so the police’s failure to preserve the evidence effectively deprived Youngblood of his rights to due process. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.
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