Thomas Aquinas
The Treatise on Law states the natural-law position at its source: law is an ordinance of reason for the common good (Q. 90); the natural law is the rational creature's participation in the eternal law (Q. 91); its first precept is that good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided (Q. 94). Question 95 introduces determinatio — that human law is derived from the natural law partly by the prudential specification of a general principle into a concrete rule.
Discussion Questions
- Aquinas says some human laws follow from the natural law "as conclusions from premises," while others are reached by determinatio, as a craftsman determines the general form of a house into this particular house (Q. 95, a. 2). Give a modern legal example of each. Why does the distinction matter for how much moral weight a given positive law carries, and for how a judge should treat it?
- Finnis reconstructs Aquinas for a contemporary audience. Keep the primary text in mind as you read Finnis: where does Finnis seem to be faithfully restating Aquinas, and where is he developing or departing from him?
John Finnis
Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (1998), pp. 219–252 · "Law as Coordination," in Philosophy of Law: Collected Essays, Vol. IV (2011), pp. 70–73 · Excerpt from A Grand Tour of Legal Theory, Collected Essays, Vol. IV (2011), pp. 119–152
Discussion Questions
- Finnis argues that political authority is justified by — and limited by — its ordering to the common good. What is the common good, on Finnis's account? How does it differ from the aggregate good of individuals (the utilitarian conception) and from the good of the collective considered as a unit? Why does the distinction matter?
- A central idea in the natural law tradition is determinatio — the prudential specification of general moral principles in particular legal rules. Why is determinatio necessary? Does the natural law place constraints on the determinations a lawmaker can legitimately make? What follows for how a judge should read a statute?
- In the short essay on law as coordination, Finnis argues that one of law's central functions is to solve coordination problems — situations where the common good requires that everyone do the same thing, but reason does not specify which thing. The classic example is the side of the road on which to drive. Why is coordination a moral function of law, not merely a practical convenience? What does this imply for the duty to obey law?
- According to Finnis's understanding of the natural law and determinatio, are there many reasonable ways to organize a polity, and may reasonable people disagree about which is best? May reasonable people disagree about what is "the common good," and if so, what does that tell us about the design of legal and political institutions?
C. S. Lewis
The Abolition of Man, Chapters 1 and 2, and the Appendix
The Abolition of Man is a defense of objective moral truth against the modern tendency to treat morality as merely subjective preference. Lewis argues that the modern attempt to "see through" all moral claims as merely subjective preferences ends in the abolition of the human being as a moral creature.
Discussion Questions
- Lewis appends to The Abolition of Man a long list — drawn from sources across cultures, civilizations, and religions — of what he calls "the Tao:" the common stock of objective moral knowledge he argues humanity has always recognized. The Appendix is offered as empirical evidence that natural law is not parochial Western Christianity but a cross-cultural recognition. Is Lewis's evidence persuasive? What does the Appendix add to Finnis — and what, if anything, does it leave unanswered?
- Is Lewis right? If a society broadly accepts the modern picture Lewis criticizes, what kinds of human beings does it tend to produce?