James Madison
Federalist No. 10 offers the extended republic as a structural solution to the problem of faction — a way of diluting passionate majorities by enlarging the political sphere.
Discussion Questions
- Has this succeeded or failed? Why or why not?
James Madison
In Federalist No. 49, Madison argues against Jefferson's proposal for frequent constitutional conventions on the grounds that "the PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in judgment."
Discussion Questions
- What does Madison mean by the "reason" of the public as distinct from its "passions?" How does government "control and regulate" the passions on his account?
- Refer back to the earlier readings about virtue. If virtue is formed in part by developing habits that check our passions, what role does, can, or should government play in facilitating individual virtue? In what ways might government interfere with the cultivation of virtue?
James Madison
Federalist No. 63 argues that the Senate exists in part to channel popular passion through institutional structures that allow reason to govern.
Discussion Questions
- How does this tension manifest in our current constitutional order? Has the modern Senate fulfilled this function? If not, what would it take to restore the Senate to its original function?
Thomas Jefferson
Jefferson's 1787 letter to his nephew Peter Carr opens a different window onto the same problem. Counseling the young Carr on his course of study, Jefferson devotes a passage to moral philosophy, arguing that morality is not the special province of trained reasoners.
Discussion Questions
- Jefferson tells his nephew that the moral sense is "as much a part of [a person] as his leg or arm," and that it can be "strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body." Is this faculty best understood as a form of reason, a form of emotion, or something else?
- Jefferson describes the "moral sense" as distinct from both "pure reason" and "raw emotion." What do you believe this "moral sense" consists of, and how does it develop in a person?
- Jefferson suggests the "ploughman" can often decide a moral question more soundly than the "professor" because the professor may be led astray by "artificial rules." What modern "artificial rules" — in law, academia, or professional life — might today similarly cloud a person's sound moral judgment?
- If morality is not the "special province of trained reasoners," where does the authority for sound moral judgment reside in a free society? What are the implications for the role of experts versus ordinary citizens in contemporary moral and political debates?
J. Joel Alicea
Drawing on Aquinas, Alicea argues that the work of moral formation is not to eliminate emotion but to educate it — to bring the passions into harmony with reason so that one not only knows what is right but feels rightly about it.
Discussion Questions
- Read Alicea's account of Aquinas alongside Jefferson and ask whether they are describing the same thing. If they are, what does it mean that a Virginia deist and a medieval Dominican converge here? If they are not, where exactly do they part company?
- If emotions and moral sense are properly part of a moral life, and if political institutions can be designed to channel passion through reason, what does this mean for contemporary debates over public discourse, political polarization, and the role of judges? Should, and do, judges today fill the function of the "cool and deliberate" voice that Federalist No. 63 assigns to the Senate?
OptimalWork
These two OptimalWork episodes carry the week's theme out of theory and into practice. Where Alicea and Aquinas describe the well-formed passions, these episodes concern the work of forming them.
Discussion Questions
- As you listen, ask whether "persuading" an emotion is the same project Aquinas describes when he speaks of educating the passions, or is it something narrower.